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"His Holiness the Pope, and may he be delivered from his actual state of bondage, as the Children of Israel were from the Land of Egypt."—LORD WELLESLEY'S TOAST. See below.

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## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALavera, its Viscount, and the CONSEQUENCES of his VICTORY.—It was evident, from the first, that there had been no victory at Talavera; and, it is now but too clearly proved, that the defeat has led to consequences the most disastrous; disastrous, I mean, because it has caused the loss of so many of our men, and the suffering of so many more.—The hirelings, whose business it is to deceive and cheat the English people, cannot any longer disguise the fact, that Douro and Talavera is running away, before he has hardly heard of his newly-bestowed titles. Still have they recourse to palliatives. Still do they tell lies to the public, in order to justify the bestowing of those titles. They say, that Talavera's retreat is a most *masterly* one. Miscreants! They would have said the same if their mothers had been left behind by him to the mercy of the "Vandals." Will these unprincipled hirelings deny, that, only the last week, they represented the French in Spain, as *ferocious barbarians*? Will they deny this; or will they deny, that this newly ennobled hero has left a great number of brave Englishmen, with festering wounds, to the *humanity* of these *ferocious barbarians*?—But, come; let us see his dispatch. Let us see this Wellesley dispatch, written by the vanquisher of Victor at Talavera. Let us see it. Let us hear what this conqueror has to say in defence of his running away from the army he had just vanquished, and for leaving his sick and wounded behind. Come, Baron Douro of Wellesley in the county of Somerset and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington, in the said county; come, thou man of many names; come, thou, whom the Morning Chronicle placed in the *first rank of British heroes*; come Baron Viscount, Douro and Talavera; come, and let us hear, in thine own way, thine own long and piteous story.—The Dispatch, which was published in London last Saturday, the 2nd instant, is dated at DELEYTOSA, on the 8th of August, which place is at about 50 or 60 miles

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distance from Talavera, the Viscount having got so far on his retreat.—The Dispatch is addressed to Lord Castlereagh. It is rich in subjects whereon to comment; and, as it will, in the end, be found to be of great importance, in many respects, I shall take it paragraph by paragraph, and observe upon each part as I proceed.

"My Lord; I apprized your lordship on the 1st inst. of the advance of a French corps towards the Puerto de Banos, and of the probable embarrassments to the operations of the army, which its arrival at Plasencia would occasion; and these embarrassments having since existed to a degree so considerable, as to oblige us to fall back, and to take up a defensive position on the Tagus, I am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upon this subject."

The *grammar* of this paragraph I will not dwell upon, taking it for granted, that Douro and Talavera has been taught the "learned languages," which is, now-a-days, I perceive, allowed to be good plea of exemption from the obligation of writing correct English, and even from that of writing common sense.—The reader will bear in mind, that, in my first article upon the battle of Talavera (page 201) I pointed out to the public the cause of *suspicion*, which it was easy enough to discover in the not publishing of the *whole* of Douro's letters of the 1st of August, of which letters (two in one day) we were treated only with *extracts*. We now see the *reason* for giving us only extracts of those letters; for here, at the very outset, Douro reminds Lord Castlereagh, that, in those letters, he apprized him of the *probable approaching embarrassments to the operations of his army*. Not a word of this did our ministers tell us; not a word of this did they publish along with the Park-and-Tower-gun account of their victory of Talavera. The nation were bidden to *rejoice*; and rejoice they did; the hirelings of the press cut their jokes, as usual, upon the chap-fallen state of the factious; the vi-

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"was believed was on its march towards the Puerto de Banôs."

That is to say towards one of the posts, to secure which he had got the Spaniards to send troops.—Now we are going to hear of the *harmony* between the English and Spanish generals. We are going to see how eager they were to fly to this post of danger. We must bear in mind that we are now about to read of what took place on the day of battle, or a day or two before, respecting this post at Banôs; though from this confused dispatch, the equal of which I never read, it is very difficult to get at a clear chain of dates, whether of time or of place.

"General Cuesta expressed some anxiety respecting this post, and sent me a message, to propose that sir Robert Wilson should be sent there with his corps.—Sir Robert was on that day at Talavera, but his corps was in the mountains towards Escalona; and as he had already made himself very useful in that quarter, and had been near Madrid, with which city he had had a communication, which I was desirous of keeping up, I proposed that a Spanish corps should be sent to Banôs without loss of time.—I could not prevail with general Cuesta, although he certainly admitted the necessity of a reinforcement when he proposed that sir Robert should be sent to Banôs; and he was equally sensible with myself of the benefit to be derived to the cause, from sending sir Robert back to Escalona.—At this time we had no further intelligence of the enemy's advance, than that the rations were ordered; and I had hopes that the enemy might be deterred from advancing, by the intelligence of our success on the 28th, and that the troops in the Puerto might make some defence; and that under these circumstances it was not desirable to divert sir R. Wilson from Escalona."

Hence it appears, that our Baron was for sending Spaniards to this important post, and that the Spanish general was for sending Portuguese and English. Cuesta's reasons we do not hear; but, really, those of our Baron do not seem to have much in them. The communication with Madrid was, I should think, by this time, become of little consequence. I do not see, why sir Robert Wilson's corps should not have

been sent; and, as to the blame openly enough attempted to be thrown upon Cuesta, he *might* merit it; but the Baron's logic does not *prove* that he *did* merit it, even admitting the *facts* to be as he states them. This is, however, quite a new way of proceeding towards allies; to accuse them, in this unqualified manner, in dispatches, which, probably, they may not see for many weeks after they are published. Cuesta is here accused of being *sensible of the benefit to be derived to the cause from not sending sir Robert Wilson to Banôs*, while he was proposing to send sir Robert Wilson to Banôs. He is accused of admitting the necessity of a reinforcement to Banôs, while he refuses to send such reinforcement.—But if it was of great importance to send a reinforcement to Banôs, why did not the Baron send one from his own army?

"On the 30th, however, I renewed my application to general Cuesta, to send there a Spanish division of sufficient strength, in a letter to gen. O'Donoghue, of which I inclose a copy, but without effect; and he did not detach gen. Bassecourt till the morning of the 2d, after we had heard that the enemy had entered Bejar, and it was obvious that the troops in the Puerto would make no defence.—On the 2d we received accounts that the enemy had entered Plasencia in two columns.—The Marquis de la Reyna, whose two battalions consisted of only 600 men, with only 20 rounds of ammunition each man, retired from the Puerto and from Plasencia, without firing a shot, and went to the bridge of Almaraz, which he declared that he intended to remove; the battalions of Bejar dispersed without making any resistance."

Were not the subject so serious; could we forget, for a moment, our poor unfortunate sick and wounded, left to have their wounds dressed and their hearts cheered by "*Vandals*" at the place whence our new-made Viscount takes his title, and whence, in all probability, he will pounce upon us for a pension; if we could forget these things, for a moment, we might laugh at the confusion of ideas that reigns through this paragraph, which sends a Spanish division in a letter to gen. O'Donoghue, and encloses lord Castlereagh a copy, but without effect.—Here, however, one thing is intelligible enough;

and, that is, that it was very foolish indeed to rely upon any defence, on the part of those who had been left to defend these important posts. What would have been the use of sending *more Spanish troops*, if such was the conduct of those already there? Cuesta appears to have been right. He appears to have known, and, probably, he said, that his countrymen *alone* would do nothing.—The same opinion, in which every event shows him to have been right, appears to have guided his propositions with respect to the future movements of the army; but, here again, we shall find his propositions rejected; and, I must confess, that, as far as I can judge, they are rejected without any good reason.—The reader will bear in mind, that the French, under Soult and others, were now known (on the 30th of July) to be coming on upon the rear of the allied army, while Victor lay, with his “*vanquished*” army in their front, and at no great distance between them and Madrid, where, as we were assured, the people were ready to rise upon Joseph Napoleon, and where sir Robert Wilson had already opened an useful communication.

“The General (Cuesta) called upon me on that day, and proposed that *half of the army* should march to the rear to oppose the enemy, whilst the other half should maintain the post at Talavera.—My answer was, that if by half the army, he meant *half of each army*, I could only answer that I was ready either to go or to stay with the whole British army, but that *I could not separate it*. He then desired me to choose whether I would go or stay, and I preferred to go, from thinking that British troops were most likely to *do the business effectually*, and *without contest*; and from being also of opinion, that it was more important to us than to the Spanish army, to open the communication through Placentia, although very important to them. With this decision General Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied.”

This was a *refusal* on the part of Wellesley; for Cuesta meant, it is very clear, for the half of *each* army to go and the other half to stay. I am not so inclined to laugh at this proposition as some people appear to be. Cuesta knew, that his troops, when *alone*, were not to be relied on; and “the gallant Sir,” though his eulogists laugh at poor Cuesta, seems to have been full as

fond of the company of the English army as Cuesta himself was. The answer, that he would *either go or stay* does not appear to have much merit in it. It was rather a pouting answer. The Spanish General could not help having the command of forces inferior to the English; nor was there any merit at all in our General in having the command of soldiers of a superior sort. Why not divide the army? I see no reason against it. The measure afforded a chance, at least, of success at both points; whereas the resolution not to divide it seemed to leave no such chance.—Besides, if Victor was “*vanquished*,” (here we pinch the Baron); if Victor was “*vanquished*,” why care for him or his movements? Why care about what was passing in the rear? Why not push on against the vanquished Victor, and, over him, to Madrid, where the people were ready to revolt against the tyrant and to proclaim Ferdinand? Why send back to seek a battle with Soult, especially as Marshal Beresford (*Marshal Beresford!*) was coming up in the rear of Soult? Why look back; why such a clutter about the rear, if there was nothing but a “*vanquished*” army between them and the loyal metropolis of the kingdom? All this is to be answered by these facts, and by nothing else; namely, that the army in front was not “*vanquished*,” that the battle was, at most for us, a drawn battle; that the allied army dared not advance an inch; and, that it is much to be doubted, whether, even for 24 hours longer, they would have been able to keep possession of Talavera.—The reasons which Baron Douro gives for choosing to go rather than stay do not appear to me sufficient by any means. He thought, that the British troops were “*more likely to do the business effectually*, and *without contest*.” What! did he think the French force so small, then, under Soult? He hardly supposed, that the very sight of our whiskers would frighten any thing of an army away. He thought, that, by going away with the whole of his army, what there was to be done, would be done “*without contest*.” Would it not have been better, then, to divide the armies, as advised by Cuesta, and, by having a little fighting at each end of the line, to defeat the French in both places?—Never was a worse reason than this. Our Baron seems to have fallen in love with doing the business “*without contest*.” I do not blame him for that; but, surely, I would not have taken *all* my army from



Talavera, in order to achieve a victory without contest, unless I could have taken my sick and wounded with me.—There was another reason, however, and that was, the utility of opening a communication with Plasencia; but, if this was so important, why was this communication suffered to be closed; and, besides, all the arguments against the other reason are good against this. It is manifest, that the Baron Douro of Wellesley was in violent haste to get away from Talavera; and it appears to me, that when the question was, which of the two armies should remain at that place, the army which had the place full of its sick and wounded ought to have remained. The army of Victor, though “*vanquished*,” was in movement in the front; and, as it was notoriously superior in numbers to that of Soult, how could Lord Viscount Talavera imagine, that Cuesta was more fit to meet it than he was?

—We now come to the movements.

“The movements of the enemy in our front, since the 1st, had induced me to be of opinion, that, desisting of forcing us at Talavera, they intended to force a passage by Escalona, and thus open a communication with the French corps coming from Plasencia.—This suspicion was confirmed on the night of the 2d, by letters received from sir Robert Wilson, of which I enclosed copies; and before I quitted Talavera on the 3d, I waited upon General O’Donoghue, and conversed with him upon the whole of our situation, and pointed out to him the possibility, that, in the case of the enemy coming through Escalona, general Cuesta *might* find himself obliged to quit Talavera, *before I should be able to return to him*; and I urged him to collect all the carts that could be got, *in order to remove our hospital*. At his desire I put the purport of this conversation in writing, and sent him a letter to be laid before general Cuesta, of which I enclosed a copy.”

From this paragraph we clearly perceive, the Baron Douro foresaw, *before he quitted Talavera*, that Cuesta would soon be after him.—Mark the cautious diplomatic turn, which the communications between these generals had now taken! He “put the purport of the conversation in writing.” And, *for what*? For what, valiant soldier? I did not know, that fire-

and-tow soldiers had so much of precaution about them. What did you put it in writing for? “Why, you fool, to send home to my lord Castlereagh, to be sure, in order to prove, that I urged the Spaniards to collect carts in order to remove my hospital.” Well; but, good Baron, what made you suspect, that such proof would be *necessary*? Did you actually anticipate, then, what would befall that unhappy hospital? Did you suspect, that Cuesta would, after all, leave great part of your suffering sick and wounded behind, in case he was attacked by Victor? —But, Baron, good Baron, if you really did think, that it was probable, that Cuesta would be unable to maintain his position against Victor, whom you had just “*vanquished*,” why did you *choose* (for you tell us you chose it) to go away, and that, too, against an *inferior* force; a force that you expected to be able to demolish *without a contest*? This question I leave to be answered by the hirelings of the press.—

The putting of the conversation in writing speaks volumes. It shows, as clearly as day-light, what was anticipated. It was at general O’Donoghue’s desire, it seems, that it was put in writing, in order that he might have a copy to send to Cuesta. Aye, aye! And so, as my Lord Talavera *happened*, I suppose, to have a copy of it left, he sent that copy to my Lord Castlereagh. It is an old saying, that you should always keep a useless thing seven years, and if you do not find a use for it in that time, throw it away. My lord Douro found, it seems, a use for this paper in just *five days* after it was written, though when he drew it up, he does not appear to have foreseen any use in it, as he states that he drew it up *at the desire of General O’Donoghue*.

“The British army marched on the 3d to Oropesa, general Basset’s Spanish corps being at Centinello, where I desired that it might halt the next day, in order that I might be nearer it.—About five o’clock in the evening, I heard that the French had arrived from Plasencia at Navalmoral, whereby they were between us and the bridge of Almaraz.—About an hour afterwards, I received from general O’Donoghue the letter and its inclosures, of which I enclose copies, announcing to me the intention of gen. Cuesta to march from Talavera in the evening, and to leave

"there my hospital, excepting such  
 "men as could be removed by the  
 "means he already had, on the ground  
 "of his apprehension that I was not  
 "strong enough for the corps coming  
 "from Plasencia, and that the enemy  
 "was moving upon his flank, and had  
 "returned to Santa Olalla in his front.—  
 "I acknowledge that these reasons  
 "did not appear to me sufficient for  
 "giving up so important a post as  
 "Talavera, for exposing the com-  
 "bined armies to an attack in front  
 "and rear at the same time, and for  
 "abandoning my hospital: and I  
 "wrote the letters of which I enclose  
 "a copy.—This unfortunately reach-  
 "ed the General after he had march-  
 "ed, and he arrived at Oropesa short-  
 "ly after day-light on the morning  
 "of the 4th."

That we have here a pretty good sample of what we have to expect from the co-operation of the Spaniards is certain; but, this we did not want; we had samples enough of this sort before; it is nothing new to us; and, the only thing that surprises us is that Baron and Viscount Talavera should have determined upon leaving his sick and wounded to the defence of an army, part of which, he tells us, in this same dispatch, had, but a few days before, scampered away, at the approach of the French, without firing a shot. This is all that surprises us; and this is what ought to be accounted for.—The Spanish General's reasons, as stated by Baron Douro, are twofold; he quits his position at Talavera, first, because he is afraid, that Soult will be too strong for the Baron; and, second, because he thinks that Victor will be too strong for himself. But, surely, there must be to be found some mitigation of this? At any rate, all *harmony* must now be at an end between Cuesta and the Baron, the latter of whom wrote, it seems, letters to him, disapproving of his movements. The game, therefore, is up, as far as depends upon co-operation between the Spanish and English army; and, indeed, from the moment I read the Baron's dispatch of the 29th of July, I was convinced, that there could be no more cordial co-operation or communication between them, and that our army would be very lucky indeed, if only one half of it ever reached England.—What remains of this dispatch is a confused detail of the movements, which took place from the 4th to the 8th of August, on which last day

the dispatch was written, concluding (feeling this to be the tender point) with an excuse for leaving behind so many of our unfortunate and suffering countrymen, upon which there remain some remarks to be made.

"The question what was to be done  
 "was then to be considered. The  
 "enemy, stated to be 30,000 strong,  
 "but at all events, consisting of the  
 "corps of Soult and Ney, either  
 "united, or not very distant from  
 "each other, and supposed by Marshal  
 "Jourdan and Joseph Buonaparté, to  
 "be sufficiently strong to attack the  
 "British army, stated to be 25,000  
 "strong, were on one side, in posses-  
 "sion of the high road to the passage  
 "of the Tagus at Almaraz, the bridge  
 "at which place we knew had been  
 "removed, although the boats still  
 "necessarily remained in the river.  
 "On the other side, we had reason to  
 "expect the advance of Victor's corps  
 "to Talavera, as soon as General Cu-  
 "esta's march should be known, and  
 "after leaving 12,000 men to watch  
 "Venegas, and allowing from 10 to  
 "11,000 killed and wounded in the  
 "late action, this corps would have  
 "amounted to 25,000. We could  
 "extricate ourselves from this diffi-  
 "cult situation only by great celerity  
 "of movement, to which the troops  
 "were unequal, as they had not had  
 "their allowance of provisions for  
 "several days, and by success in two  
 "battles. If unsuccessful in either,  
 "we should have been without a re-  
 "treat; and if Soult and Ney, avoid-  
 "ing an action, had retired before us,  
 "and had waited the arrival of Vic-  
 "tor, we should have been exposed  
 "to a general action with 50,000  
 "men, equally without a retreat. We  
 "had reason to expect, that as the  
 "marquis de la Reyna could not re-  
 "move the boats from the river Al-  
 "maraz, Soult would have destroyed  
 "them. Our only retreat was, there-  
 "fore, by the bridge of Arço Bispo;  
 "and if we had moved on, the enemy,  
 "by breaking that bridge while the  
 "army should be engaged with Soult  
 "and Ney, would have deprived us  
 "of that only resource. We could  
 "not take a position at Oropesa, as  
 "we thereby left open the road to  
 "the bridge of Arço Bispo from Tala-  
 "vera by Calera; and after consider-



ing the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion, that it was advisable to retire to the bridge of Arço Bispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus, I was induced to adopt this last opinion, because the French have now at least 50,000 men disposable to oppose to the combined armies, and a corps of 12,000 men to watch Vaganzas: and I was likewise of opinion, that the sooner the defensive line should be taken up, the more likely were the troops to be able to defend it. Accordingly I marched on the 4th, and crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arço Bispo, and have continued my route to this place, in which I am well situated to defend the passage of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. General Cuesta crossed the river on the night of the 5th, and he is still at the bridge of Arço Bispo. *About 2,000 of the wounded have been brought away from Talavera, the remaining 1,500 are there; and I doubt whether, under any circumstances, it would have been possible or consistent with humanity, to attempt to remove any more of them. From the treatment which some of the soldiers wounded on the 27th, and who fell into the hands of the enemy, experienced from them, and from the manner in which I have always treated the wounded who have fallen into my hands, I expect that these men will be well-treated; and I have only to lament, that a new concurrence of events, OVER WHICH, from circumstances, I HAD AND COULD HAVE NO CONTROUL,* should have placed the army in a situation to be obliged to leave any of them behind."

"Oh! most lame and impotent conclusion," of a big-sounding adventure!—Reader, let us not be blinded by this confused account. Let us, while we have the thing before us, blow the dust away, and get a sight of the matter as it really stands.—Here we find the Baron and his army, or, rather, the remains of it, at a place called Deleytosa, on the banks of the river Tagus, fifty miles, perhaps, below Talavera, and, of course, so much nearer Portugal, so much nearer the spot whence he had originally started in pursuit of the Tartar, Victor, so far, in short, on his re-

treat. Well, what brought him hither? Aye, Nabob's print, answer us that question. What brought him hither?—Well, then, that question being so full of gravel, answer us this: with *what view* did he leave Talavera? Was it not with a view of going in quest of Soult? and, did he not assign as a reason, for quitting Talavera, and leaving his hospital to the care and defence of the Spaniards, that he thought he and his army would "*do the business effectually, and without a contest?*" Now *what business* was it, that induced him thus to quit his post and to leave his hospital? Why, *the meeting and the beating of Soult*, to be sure, and this he was pretty confident of doing without a contest. But, behold, having quitted Talavera, having marched from his Viscounty and his hospital with this view, and with this avowed intention, instead of going on to meet Soult, and to "*do the business effectually,*" he turns short to his left, and gets over, with all possible alacrity, to that side of the Tagus where Soult is *not*, and we hear him talk of nothing but of broken down bridges, intercepted retreats, being placed between two fires; and, in short, of all sorts of dangers.—Reader, compare the two parts of the dispatch, and make use of your senses in pronouncing upon the conduct of this General, even as represented by himself. What prevented him from pursuing his original intention of going on to meet Soult? What had happened to supercede that intention? Nothing can be pretended to have happened except the quitting of Talavera by Cuesta, and even that the Baron had anticipated before he himself quitted Talavera. In short, it is to insult the understandings of my readers to suppose, that they do not clearly perceive, that the Baron is utterly unable to reconcile those two parts of his dispatch; that his marching to meet Soult was, in fact, marching from Victor; and that, from beginning to end, we have, in this dispatch, nothing but attempts to disguise the real character of the operations and the real nature of the situation of our army.—Such attempts succeed with the very ignorant, and with those who wish to be deceived; but, men of sense, after reading long and confused accounts, recur to main points; and, when they do that, in this case, these are the facts that strike them: Douro and Talavera and Cuesta chose to go in pursuit of Victor; on the 29th of July Douro and Talavera alone "*vanquished*" Victor, Cuesta having stood by as a spectator; from

the 29th of July to the 3rd of August Douro and Talavera and Cuesta lay at Talavera without budging an inch after the "vanquished" Victor; on the 3rd of August Douro and Talavera quits his Viscounty and leaves his hospital to the care and defence of Cuesta, in order to go and meet Soult, and to *do his business effectually and without contest*; on the 4th of August, Cuesta, fearing that his friend Douro would not be a match for "the cursed Soult," and seeing the *vanquished* Victor, like a wounded snake, beginning to stir again, went after Talavera and his army; once more united, on the 4th of August, they, instead of going on to do Soult's business effectually and without contest, join together and most cordially co-operate in getting across the Tagus, lest their retreat should be cut off. This is the story they tell. Here it is in a few short sentences; and, though the people in general may not, at once, see the real truth, through this confused mass of insignificant detail, they will see it in the end; but, I am by no means satisfied, that the conviction will produce any good effect, so complete is the chain of influence and of dependance.—Upon the last dispatch I observed, that our Viscount avoided to give us even any hint as to the ACTUAL NUMBERS of either the *Spanish Army* or HIS OWN, while he was wonderfully minute in his accounts of the force of the French, their losses, and all other matters relating to them. The present dispatch is still more strongly marked with that suspicious omission. Douro of Wellesley is endeavouring, he is labouring hard, to give us a satisfactory reason for his determination to get over the Tagus; that is to say, in the language of the GENERAL ORDER, applied to the French, to *escape* from Soult and Victor. They had not *actually joined*, you will observe; but, *he supposed they might join*, and, upon that supposition he, in order to avoid having his retreat cut off, hastened to get over the Tagus. In order to shew us, that this measure was not resolved upon without reasonable cause of apprehension, he falls to work, and has all his fingers in motion, counting the *numbers of the French*. He takes them in detail; tells us how many Soult has and how many Victor has left; and, he brings, at last, into the field, 50 thousand men, under these two generals (*both of whom he had vanquished, observe*) to fight against him and his Spanish allies. Now, I ask the reader whether it be possible for it not

to occur to Douro, upon this occasion, that his statement was not worth a straw, unaccompanied with a statement of his *own numbers and those of Cuesta*? It is a reason of *numbers* that he is giving us; and, could it have escaped him, that the numbers on one side were of no use without those on the other side? No: this could not have escaped him; and it is not necessary to point out to the reader *why* a statement of the numbers of our army and of that of Cuesta was omitted. The reason is too plain not to be perceived, even by this hood winked nation.—But, if our Baron does not choose to give us a statement of numbers, there are those who will do it, and who *have done it*. To be sure, it was without a parallel to be so minute, not only as to the numbers of the enemy, but as to what the *enemy said* of our numbers! He could tell us what the enemy said of our numbers, but did not think it necessary to tell us himself what they were. No thanks to you, then, Baron Douro of Wellesley, Joseph Napoleon and his war-minister will tell us, and they will tell us, too, a little more about your "*hospital*," and about your crossing the Tagus at the bridge of Arço Bispo, to *take up a defensive position*, than you have thought proper to tell us.—The following PROCLAMATION, signed by Joseph Napoleon, and the ORDER OF THE DAY which follows it, signed by BELLARD, governor of Madrid, are both dated on the 10th of August, two days, the reader will perceive, *after* the date of Baron Douro's last dispatch.

PROCLAMATION, MADRID, AUGUST 10.  
 "Soldiers! It is scarcely fifteen days since  
 "120,000 enemies, consisting of English,  
 "Portuguese, and Spaniards, who marched  
 "from different points, rendezvoused under  
 "the walls of my capital; but united on  
 "the 26th of July at the bridge of Guadarrama, the 1st and 4th corps, and the  
 "reserve, defeated, on that day, the enemy.  
 "On the 27th he repassed, in great haste,  
 "the Alberche. On the 28th, attacked  
 "in a position judged unattackable, 80,000  
 "men have not been able to contend against  
 "40,000 French.—From that time, re-  
 "nouncing their chimerical project of  
 "conquest, they have thought but of safe-  
 "ty, and have abandoned the field of  
 "battle. More than 6,000 English wounded  
 "are in our hospitals.—The least of our corps,  
 "the 1st, was judged sufficient to keep in  
 "check this army, still so numerous in  
 "spite of its losses. It remained upon the  
 "Alberche, while the 4th corps and the



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“reserve set out on the 29th to succour  
 “Toledo, besieged by the army of La  
 “Mancha, and that of Madrid, menaced  
 “by the same army, has forced the enemy,  
 “already within four leagues of the ca-  
 “pital, to relinquish its prey. It has re-  
 “passed the Tagus, in the greatest haste,  
 “and flies towards the Sierra Morena, after  
 “having abandoned some thousands of  
 “killed, wounded and prisoners. The 2d,  
 “5th and 6th corps are following the rear  
 “guard of the enemy’s army. These  
 “corps formed a junction with the 1st  
 “corps at Orchason, on the 7th August.—  
 “*The English fly in every way in disorder,*  
 “*and by roads hitherto judged impracticable*  
 “*to artillery. The 2d and 5th corps are*  
 “*pursuing them.*—Soldiers! you have saved  
 “my capital, the King of Spain thanks  
 “you; you have done more, the brother  
 “of your Emperor sees flying before your  
 “eagles the eternal enemy of the French  
 “name. The Emperor will know all that  
 “you have done, he will acknowledge the  
 “brave who have made themselves con-  
 “spicuous among the brave, those who  
 “have received honourable wounds; and  
 “if he says to us, “I am content with  
 “you,” we shall be sufficiently recom-  
 “pensed.”

“ORDER OF THE DAY, MADRID, AUG.  
 “10.—The First and Fifth Corps over-  
 “took, *beyond the bridge of Arcobispo, the*  
 “*rear guard of the English Army, entirely*  
 “*destroyed it, and took from it thirty pieces*  
 “*of cannon, their caissons, a great part of*  
 “*their equipage, many horses, and a great*  
 “*number of prisoners.*—It is also in pursuit  
 “of the army of Vanegas, and has made  
 “a great number of prisoners; it has re-  
 “tired into the mountains of Sierra Mo-  
 “rena.”

Observe again, these papers are of a  
 date *two days later* than the dispatch of  
 Wellesley. I perceive, that the hireling  
 prints do not appear to pay any attention  
 at all to this statement in the ORDER OF  
 THE DAY, though corroborated by Joseph  
 Napoleon’s Proclamation, which was writ-  
 ten, it appears, on the 9th at Toledo. The  
 hirelings do not believe a word of the  
*flight and disorder*, mentioned in the pro-  
 clamation; nor of the *destruction of our rear*  
*guard, beyond the bridge of Arcobispo*, and  
 the loss of some of our cannon, baggage,  
 and horses; and the reason why the hire-  
 lings do not believe any thing of this, is,  
 that the event must have taken place be-  
 fore the 8th of August, and Baron Douro  
 of Wellesley *does not say any thing about it.*

Now, for my part, I find quite enough to  
 do in believing what he *does* say, and shall  
 certainly draw no favourable conclusions  
 from what he *does not* say. Not to waste  
 time and paper, I believe the Order of the  
 Day and the Proclamation to be substan-  
 tially correct. Some exaggeration I al-  
 ways allow for on both sides; but, be-  
 tween Talavera’s dispatches, and the pub-  
 lications of Belliard and his sovereign,  
 there is this important distinction; that  
 while the latter are issued and read upon  
 the spot, almost upon the field of battle,  
 and, at any rate, amongst those who are,  
 from their local situation, able to discover  
 any material mis-statement in them; while  
 this is the case with respect to the French  
 publications, the dispatches of our Baron  
 are published where it is almost impossible  
 to disprove their contents, and where, sup-  
 posing the truth of those contents to be  
 questionable, there are always hireling  
 pens in abundance to defend whatever is  
 published by authority. It must, in most  
 cases, be some months before any state-  
 ment, made in a dispatch from abroad,  
 can be fully examined, and compared  
 with facts; by that time, the examina-  
 tion becomes useless; and so it goes off.  
 Quite different is it, and must it be, with  
 those who have to address armies and peo-  
 ple upon the spot. (By-the-bye, we see no  
 Proclamation of our Viscount to his army  
 and to the people of his Viscounty). Quite  
 different must it be in that case. If, for  
 instance, the English army had not been  
 overtaken at Arcobispo and been attacked,  
 in the manner stated by Belliard, does any  
 one believe, that Belliard, who issues his  
 Order at Madrid, only about eighty miles  
 from Arcobispo, or less perhaps, would  
 have so positively asserted such a fact? A  
 fact, too, of such great importance, a state-  
 ment entering into particulars, “30 pieces  
 “of cannon, their covered waggons, a  
 “great part of their equipage, many horses,  
 “and a great number of prisoners?” Does  
 any man believe, that Belliard, the gover-  
 nor of Madrid, would have published this,  
 if it had not had, at least, *some truth* in it?  
 Does any man believe, that he would have  
 published upon the spot, so gross, so glar-  
 ing, so impudent, and so useless a falshood?  
 Yet Baron Douro of Wellesley, though he  
 wrote *four days after his passage of the bridge*  
*of Arcobispo*, says not a word about so im-  
 portant a matter. Let us remember this;  
 for, in the end, the truth must all come out.  
 —Again, if the French had had but  
 1,500 of our sick and wounded left in their

hands, must not the impudence of Joseph Napoleon be such as to surpass even those who manufacture lies for our home-consumption? He addresses himself to his *Soldiers*. Some of these, at any rate, must know what an impudent liar he is, if there be only 1,500 of our poor souls in his hospitals; if that be the case, they must know him to be not only a liar but a braggart, and, no man likes to be known for such, or to expose himself to the risk of it, as he evidently must by making such a statement, in so solemn a manner, to those who are upon the spot, and thousands of whom must be acquainted with the real state of the case.—Yet, he does say, that there are 6,000; aye, “*more than six thousand*” “*ENGLISH* wounded in his hospitals.” There is great difference between “*more than six thousand*,” and “*one thousand five hundred*.”—Then, as to the numbers of the armies, it is singular enough, that, exclusive of the corps of Sir Robert Wilson and General Craufurd, our hirelings stated the allied army at as many within 16,000 men as Joseph Napoleon now states it at. He says 120,000 all together. Our hirelings, before the battle of Talavera, put it 104,000, exclusive of the two corps above-mentioned.—Joseph Napoleon says, we had 80,000 men in the battle of Talavera, and Victor 40,000. Victor has sent 12,000 in pursuit of Venegas, he lost (our Baron says) 11,000 in the battle of Talavera, consequently he has only 17,000 left, which number, joined to Soult’s 25,000, who were “*totally discomfited on the Douro*,” make 42,000 men; while we and the Spaniards have, according to Joseph Napoleon’s account, 70,000 men to oppose to them, supposing us to have lost *ten* thousand at Talavera. *I believe* Joseph Napoleon’s statement of numbers; and I believe it the more firmly, because Baron Douro so cautiously avoids saying any thing that may lead us even to *guess* at his numbers or those of Cuesta. If all had been as it ought to be, why should he withhold from us this statement of numbers. Joseph Napoleon talks of numbers; of *his own* as well as of those of his enemy; but, Joseph Napoleon has, I am afraid, *real* victories to announce; and that it is which induces him to state numbers.—This nation, whatever other faults it may have, is never deficient on the score of compassion, and, therefore, I will not harrow up the bosoms of my readers by an attempt to describe the situation of our unfortunate countrymen, and the dearest relations of

some of us, lying in the hospitals at the mercy of an enemy whom our hirelings call Vandals, and that, too, at a place, the name of which makes part of a title for their commander, purchased with their valour! This commander tells us, indeed, that, under any circumstances, it would not have been *consistent with humanity* to attempt to remove any more of the wounded. May be so; but, was it *absolutely necessary* to leave them? The Baron says, that he had his choice to go, or to stay, and that *he chose to go*, and not to stay.—But, it seems, that the French are not “*Vandals*,” that they *take very good care of our wounded* that fall into their hands; and, that there is every reason to suppose, that our helpless countrymen at Talavera “*will be well-treated*.” This is a consoling discovery; and, like all other good things, though good in itself, it is the better for coming *precisely at the moment that it is wanted*. We wanted a discovery of this sort; we wanted to find out that the French were humane; this was wanted, in order to palliate the calamity, which had befallen our army, and which could no longer be disguised; we wanted the discovery, and we have made it. Now, then, let the hireling tribe stay their attacks, for a while, at least, upon the “*Vandals*,” and let that pensioned doggerel-maker, FITZGERALD, be taught by his setters-on, that though his pen is unequal to the task of arousing any good passion, it may succeed in arousing evil ones. Let the turtle-patriots, if they must meet and toast, restrain their disposition to abuse the French, merely because they fear them. Our new Viscount bears witness to the humanity of the French. Oh! what a fact to publish to the people of England! I question but it is, by some people, considered as by far the most melancholy fact in the whole of this melancholy dispatch; and, certain I am, that if any writer in England had represented the French as a humane and generous enemy, he would, by all the hirelings of the day, have been represented as a most diabolical Jacobin.—We now come to the last sentence of this dismal dispatch. I cannot help repeating it. “*I have only to lament, that “a new concurrence of events, over which, “from circumstances I had, and could have, “no controul, should have placed the army “in a situation to be obliged to leave any “of them, (the wounded) behind.”*—This is dismal, indeed. I could almost pity the man who wrote it, though half a dozen new names have been lately tacked



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to his own. What! "*no controul*" over these events! Did he not *choose* to march into Spain? Did he not choose to pursue Victor? Did he not choose to fight with that Tartar and to "*vanquish*" him? Did he not choose to remain at Talavera and not push on after the "*vanquished*" Victor? And, lastly, does he not expressly say, that he *chose* to come away from Talavera, *leaving his hospital there*, and that, too, under circumstances that made him think it necessary to have a diplomatic conversation with General O'Donoghue about the latter's collecting carts, in order to bring away our poor fellows, who were sick and wounded! You have been made a Baron and a Viscount for your deeds through the campaign, for your ability, valour, and "*military resource*;" and do you now tell us, that you had "*no controul*" over the events that have occurred? Why not the same controul *after*, as well as *before* and during, your success; You must take the whole of the campaign together. If you had "*no controul*" in the retreat, you had none in the advance; if none in your defeats, none in your victories.—If you mean merely to say: "*I can't help it*;" it is very well. The Archduke Charles could not help it, the other day; but, he did not pretend, that he had "*no controul*" over what was passing. He did not make use of any phrase, calculated to produce an impression, that he was, in this case, to be looked upon as having nothing to do with the matter.—It is easy to see, that the blame is to fall upon Cuesta; but, as far as I have power in this way, I shall make a point of seeing that he has fair play. I have not yet forgotten the fate of poor Sir Hugh and Burrard. Any body but a Wellesley was then to be sacrificed; and we shall, I am convinced, now see some pretty work with regard to Cuesta. The thing is now, however, a little more difficult; for, it will be necessary to include, more or less, the Spanish *army* in the blame with Cuesta; and, then, we come to the fulfilment of my predictions, when the hirelings said, that I was "*instigated by the Devil*."—Our Baron seems to have been seized with a wonderful degree of *precaution*, all at once. He talks of bridges and retreats, counts the numbers of his enemies, measures the distances they have to march before they can get at him, calculates all the chances of defeat with the greatest nicety; does not move a leg, without first looking all round him. There is

a time for all things; but, with due submission to the Viscount, I am of opinion, that, when he got into the situation, described towards the close of his dispatch, the time for *caution* was passed, and the time for *dashing* arrived. The time for caution was, when he *entered* Spain. It is easy to dash; it is easy to be "*a dasher*," when the enemy is forty leagues off, or is retreating before you with half your numbers. Any body can dash under such circumstances. But, the dasher that I like to see is, a dasher who *falls on upon superior numbers*, or who, when in the centre of difficulties, resolves upon *fighting*, instead of *marching*, his way through them. That is the sort of dasher that I like; and is, I believe, the sort, which, hitherto, has been generally approved of in this country, though I will not answer for it, that in complaisance to the Wellesleys the nation may not acknowledge, that its taste, in this respect, has been erroneous.—While these things are going on in the heart of Spain, the MARQUIS is at work in the southern part of that devoted country. I shall have no room, in my present number, to touch upon any other subject than that of Spain; but, I prefer finishing it to the introduction of the Expedition to Holland, or any thing else, Spain being at this moment, the great object of our hopes and our fears, or, rather, of the hopes of the foolish and the fears of the wise.—This war for Ferdinand VII. was first proclaimed by Mr. Canning, at the London Tavern, amidst the shouts of loyal contractors and stock-jobbers. Just such another set has, it seems, met to celebrate the arrival of the Marquis in Spain. The Account of this celebration is most curious, and well worthy of being recorded. I will, therefore, insert it here, just as I find it in the hireling news-papers; and, the reader may be assured, that he will often have occasion to refer to it.

CADIZ, 13 AUG.—"It is barely possible to imagine a more remarkable moment than that which hailed the appearance of his excellency the marquis Wellesley in this country; and, as if purposing to enrol his arrival among the *memorabilia of Spain*, PROVIDENCE seems to have fixed the hour, when overflowing with admiration and gratitude towards his brother, for the signal services Spain and her cause had derived from British courage and British gallantry, under sir Arthur's command, on the 28th of July. The day, ushered in by the ringing of

“ bells and the discharge of cannon, was  
 “ closed with a most brilliant and ge-  
 “ neral illumination, and every other de-  
 “ monstration of joy the inhabitants of  
 “ Cadiz could display.—To enumerate  
 “ the honours paid to the Marquis, would  
 “ exceed the limits of a letter ; his recep-  
 “ tion was distinguished by marks of enthu-  
 “ siastic love and veneration for the sove-  
 “ reign and nation he is come to represent,  
 “ that assuredly never have been surpassed,  
 “ if ever equalled, on any occasion ; and  
 “ which must have been to his excellency,  
 “ individually, a source of proud and gra-  
 “ tifying sensation. An immense con-  
 “ course of persons, without distinction of  
 “ rank, had assembled to meet the Mar-  
 “ quis on his landing, and many were  
 “ paying him the rather unusual compli-  
 “ ment, in this country, of drawing the  
 “ carriage, the doors of which were open,  
 “ the box and every part occupied pro-  
 “ miscuously by those eager to greet his  
 “ arrival. His excellency selected one  
 “ out of the number, and gave him a purse  
 “ well stocked with gold, to distribute  
 “ among his fellow-citizens ; but the ho-  
 “ nest Spaniard, named Justo Lobato, by  
 “ trade a shoe-maker, instantly returned  
 “ the purse, with its contents, to the Mar-  
 “ quis ; and in the name, and amidst the  
 “ acclamations of the surrounding multi-  
 “ tude, coupled their thanks for his intended  
 “ princely gift, with the assurance, as an  
 “ apology for declining it, that the proofs of  
 “ respect, esteem and gratitude, he was then  
 “ witnessing, were the genuine and univer-  
 “ sal sentiment of the whole Spanish na-  
 “ tion, who found the only reward they  
 “ could most value in the opportunity of  
 “ thus manifesting their feelings.—The Bri-  
 “ tish subjects here, merchants and others,  
 “ were of course not behind-hand in the  
 “ attention due to the Representative of  
 “ their beloved Sovereign : through our  
 “ worthy and respected Consul, James  
 “ Duff, esq. they begged permission to  
 “ wait on his Excellency in a body, by  
 “ whom they were received with affabili-  
 “ ty and urbanity, at once honourable to  
 “ him, and flattering to them.—On Mon-  
 “ day, the 7th inst. the day fixed upon by  
 “ the Marquis, the entertainment pre-  
 “ pared for his Excellency was honoured  
 “ by his presence, that of his suite, the  
 “ heads of the Government, Army, Navy,  
 “ and other departments, the British Ad-  
 “ miral, and other Officers of distinction,  
 “ the Sicilian Ambassador, the Pope’s  
 “ Nuncio, several of the first Grandees,

“ and other Spanish Noblemen, the prin-  
 “ cipal British Merchants, and others con-  
 “ nected in the trade of both countries,  
 “ &c. &c.—The dinner on the occasion  
 “ was in the most capacious room Cadiz  
 “ could afford, at the Land-gate, or Puerta de  
 “ Tierra ; and the whole was conducted in  
 “ a manner that reflects the highest credit  
 “ on the Managers, at the head of whom  
 “ were James Gordon, esq. President, and  
 “ Duncan Shaw, esq. Vice President.—  
 “ Two regimental bands, Spanish and Eng-  
 “ lish, struck up favourite airs to welcome  
 “ the company as they alighted from their  
 “ carriages.—At half-past three the table  
 “ was served, and between the removal of  
 “ the first and the introduction of the se-  
 “ cond course, the President gave as a  
 “ toast, which was drank with three times  
 “ three :—

“ “ *His Excellency the Most Noble the*  
 “ “ *Marquis Wellesley ;* and may the auspi-  
 “ “ *cious moment of his arrival prove the*  
 “ “ *presage of continued successes, and of*  
 “ “ *perpetual amity and union between the two*  
 “ “ *countries.*”

“ His Excellency, in a concise, but most  
 “ admirable speech, took occasion to ad-  
 “ dress the meeting ; and concluded by  
 “ expressing, in a tone of energy and  
 “ confidence, in which every one present  
 “ sympathised, his firm belief and hope,  
 “ that a perseverance in the enthusiastic  
 “ spirit of attachment to their country’s  
 “ cause, which he had remarked since his  
 “ arrival, would afford him the gratifica-  
 “ tion, before he left Spain, of seeing the  
 “ liberty of the country firmly establish-  
 “ ed on the basis of their ancient institu-  
 “ tions, improved and perfected by the ex-  
 “ perience of modern wisdom.—When the  
 “ desert was placed, independently of the  
 “ plateaux, ornaments, and other devices  
 “ suited to the day, the table presented a  
 “ very pleasing, though perhaps novel  
 “ sight, to the British eye, the cloth being  
 “ decorated with graceful festoons, formed  
 “ by variegated coloured leaves of dif-  
 “ ferent odoriferous flowers, terminating  
 “ at each end with the Spanish motto :—

“ *Vivan Fernando Septimo y Jorge*  
 “ *Tercero.*” (1)

“ After dinner, the following toasts  
 “ were given in succession, in both lan-

(1) “ Long live Ferdinand the seventh and  
 “ George the third.”

N. B. The opposite end was reversed,  
 and George the third placed first in the  
 motto.



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"guages, accompanied with appropriate  
"popular Spanish or English airs, marches,  
" &c.

"*" Ferdinand the Seventh "*—with three  
"times three.

"*" George the Third "*—with three times  
"three.

"The following were drank with three  
"only:

"*" The Emperor of Austria, and our other  
"Allies."*

"*" Spain; and may the heroic efforts of her  
"brave and loyal People terminate in the  
"complete restoration of her Independence,  
"Liberty, and Glory."*

"*" His Excellency General Don Gregorio  
"de la Cuesta."*

"*" His Excellency General sir Arthur  
"Wellesley."*

"*" The Archduke Charles of Austria, and  
"success to the Austrian Arms."*

"*" The Spanish Armies, and their gallant  
"Commanders."*

"*" The British Army, and their gallant  
"Commanders."*

"*" The British Navy."*

"*" The Spanish Navy."*

Given by the Marquis before sitting  
down.

"*" His Holiness the Pope, and may he be  
"delivered from his actual state of bondage,  
"as the Children of Israel were from the  
"land of Egypt."*

"*" The Supreme Central Junta of Spain,  
"and may the means employed by them to  
"place the country in its present proud situ-  
"ation, never fail them until they have ac-  
"complished the great end to which they  
"have pledged themselves."*

"*" The Immortal Defenders of Saragossa  
"and Gerona."*

"*" The Heroes of Baylen."*

"*" The loyal Inhabitants of the Spanish  
"Colonies, and prosperity to their Commerce  
"and Establishments."*

"*" The City of Cadiz, the prosperity of its  
"Commerce, and happiness of its worthy In-  
"habitants."*

"At about eight in the evening the  
"dinner party withdrew, to prepare for  
"the ball that was to follow at the The-  
"atre; and at which not only the nobili-  
"ty, gentry, merchants, with their ladies  
"resident at Cadiz, but those of Puerto,  
"Santa Maria, Isla, Xerez, and every  
"other place within reach of the very  
"short notice that could be given, were  
"invited. The Theatre was most bril-  
"liantly illuminated, and so contrived,  
"that the stage and pit, forming a most

"spacious saloon for the amateurs of  
"dancing, left the first and second range  
"of boxes for spectators who chose to ap-  
"pear in full dress. The third and upper  
"boxes were for the accommodation of  
"those who came in the usual costume of  
"the country; and the remaining parts of  
"the house were appropriated for the  
"other inhabitants, among whom tickets  
"of admission had also been distributed.  
"At the end of the saloon over the stage  
"a transparency was placed, with the de-  
"vice:—

"*" Vivan Cuesta y Wellesley, y los bizarros  
"Defensores de la Patria, del dia 28 de  
"Julio."* (2)

"At the end opposite, and between the  
"portraits of the Kings of Great Britain  
"and Spain, which were surmounted by  
"the Royal Standards of both Nations,  
"another transparency had the following  
"inscription: (3)

Ferdinando el mas amado,  
Victima de traicion;  
Tu pueblo ha de vengarte,  
Con fe y resolucion.  
Espana, Espana toda,  
Su vota ha de cumplir;  
Por su fe y su Rey,  
De vencer o morir.

"As an attempt to do justice to the  
"splendor of the scene, to the assem-  
"blage of rank, fashion, beauty and ele-  
"gance, that graced the Theatre, is out  
"of all question, some faint idea may still  
"be formed, from the fact of between  
"three and four thousand persons hav-  
"ing attended; and that, until seven  
"o'clock on the morning of the Tuesday,  
"the merry dance was kept alive with  
"that vivacity so peculiar to the Spanish  
"fair: at this hour the house was cleared,  
"and all had retired, highly pleased,  
"and in perfect good humour with each  
"other."

Now, for my part, I should not be at all  
surprized if this doggerel was manufac-  
tured here in England, and carried out to  
Spain for the occasion. The whole thing

(2) "Long live Cuesta and Wellesley, and  
"the valiant defenders of the Country, on  
"the 28th July."

(3) Ferdinand, most beloved,  
By a treacherous foe betrayed,  
Thy people shall avenge thy cause,  
With firmness undismayed.  
Each Spaniard's heart and hand shall join,  
And shout the nation's cry,  
For their Faith and their King,  
To conquer or to die.

is so of a piece with the precious fooleries that are so frequently witnessed at the London Tavern, that I should not wonder, if even the toasts had been first written here and sent out, ready printed. There only wanted half a score hired singers to make the thing sterling English.—It is mightily good, to be sure, to see “the hour fixed by PROVIDENCE,” in order that the reception of the Marquis might unite, in point of time, with his Brother’s victories! By this time, the tone of the wretched parasites must be changed, I suppose, and it would be no wonder, if they were to abuse Providence as much as they have abused the French.—Along with this account of Wellesley’s reception, there has appeared, in the hireling newspapers, a letter, or pretended letter, from Cadiz, of the 14th of August, which concludes thus:—“Various reports are abroad “of Soult, with the wreck of his army, “without artillery, having reached the “Puerte de Almaraz and surrendered; but “there is nothing certain. *The Marquis* “left this on the 9th for Seville, under a “grand salute from the Muralla. *Every* “body has a good opinion of him, and anticipates great things if he is but stationary.— “Pay no attention to the reports and gloomy stuff you will have in abundance per the “packet. Every thing is going on as well “as can be expected in a contest with such “experienced foes, and with an enemy “who has so much at stake. Intrigues “were on foot, and report says *Frere* was “made a fool of; but the Marquis has set “to work the right way.”—This is curious. The reader may be assured, that this was not written without an intended effect in England. POOR FRERE! “made a fool of,” indeed! I wonder who could be fool enough to set about that job? Poor fellow! He that used to cap such pretty verses in the Anti-Jacobin newspaper! It really grieves me to see him handled in this contemptuous way.—Well; but there is the Marquis at Seville, then? There he is. He has taken all upon him; and, we are told, he has “set to work the “right way.” He has told the Spaniards, we see, that he expects, before he leaves Spain, to see “the liberty of the country “firmly established.” What sort that liberty is of, none of us can, perhaps, precisely tell, but, this we may be assured of, that he means to include the *expulsion of the French*. This is the point. I want nothing more than this. He is now where I have long wished to see him. He was,

afraid, I dare say, that, when Buonaparté went away into Germany and took nine tenths of his army along with him, there would be nothing left in Spain for him to do. So was I too; for, I really did wish to see how the Marquis and his brothers would beat the Buonapartés, though, I must confess, that I had my suspicions that French armies were not quite so easily beaten as the armies of the Nabob Vizier of Oude.—I wonder if the Nabob Vizier of Oude be alive. I wish poor Paull was.—I wish the eyes of the nation to be fixed upon this scene. I wish it not, for one moment, to lose sight of the Wellesleys. This is our great family; our race of statesmen and heroes. I will not disguise my weakness: I did feel a little vexed at the thought of the Wellesleys being sent to Spain, just after Napoleon and his army appeared to be got into embarrassments in Germany. I will confess, that I was mortified at the thought of our great family being deprived of an opportunity of facing the race of Napoleons. The war in Germany is now over; and, really, if the Emperor himself should not return to Spain, it does appear that the Dukes of Belluno and Dalmatia will, for a time, at least, find employment for our family. Not for long, without doubt; for that would be a mortification indeed.—Some of the hirelings, enemies of the country, have hinted, that our Baron is coming home. What! come home! Oh, no; that will never do. There will be no coming home, I trust, for any one of the family, till the battle has been fairly fought out. No, no: they have taken to the concern, at a moment, too, when Buonaparté was hard pushed upon the Danube, and it will never do to transfer it now to other hands. The hero of Talavera and Douro has got his titles, and I hope he will remain to finish his work. The hireling prints must, however, be watched; for, I clearly see, that they are endeavouring to prepare the public for something of the sort just spoken of.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 7 August, 1809.

#### THE EDINBURGH REVIEWERS, AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

SIR;—I have just read the Edinburgh Review on the subject of Parliamentary Reform. Knowing the party to which these Reviewers belong, it was easy to anticipate their sentiments on this subject; and I was



not so curious to learn their opinions as to ascertain the arguments by which they would support them. The article is long and elaborate, and very philosophical; and I need hardly mention diametrically opposite to your opinions. But, as Junius has remarked, much is not always proved where much is said; and I think a very few words only will be necessary to prove the complete fallacy of their doctrines.—In the first place we must agree with them that a vast influence must naturally follow the taxes raised to pay the interest of our overgrown debt and public establishments; and every person must admit that this is an evil which a Reform in Parliament may palliate but cannot cure. All patronage, they go on to demonstrate, is substantially vested in the majority of the House of Commons; and that this House of Commons is again chosen by “certain individuals” who, in consequence of long hereditary connection and other causes which need not be explained, have obtained the power, not only of securing their own election, but of several of their friends also. But the question of the policy of breaking down this monopoly they rather evade by saying that “the people themselves are infected with the love of place and emolument;” and that patronage naturally begets “a proclivity in them to side with the executive.” They therefore recommend to us to go on in the old way of playing off one set of the present sort of men against another.—The simple answer to all this is, that in the present state of things, the majority of the House of Commons, by their acknowledgment, represents only certain Borough-mongers, whereas in a reformed state it would represent the nation. Few indeed know so little of human nature as to imagine that men will not always be governed by their own interest; and that the people, supposing a Reform to have taken place, would not still seek place and emolument by siding with the majority of the House of Commons, or with a ministry chosen by them, which is the same thing. But in the former case that majority would be the representatives of Borough-mongers, in the latter of the nation; and in the one case the people would have to recommend themselves by doing that which was agreeable to Borough-mongers, in the other to the nation. It cannot be conceived that any representation of the whole people and property of the kingdom periodically responsible to their constituents, could

have motives for being corrupt themselves, or for countenancing corruption in others. When a fair representation took place, every object of ambition would be acquired more easily by legitimate than indirect means; and we would then never see a ministry endeavouring to keep their places by appointing “any person recommended by those powerful individuals” who chuse the House of Commons, “however slenderly qualified, to any situation however important,” because they would have the advantage of the whole to consult, and would be necessitated to rely upon the integrity and wisdom of their measures alone, for the popularity of their administration. A few (Borough-mongers) may have an interest different from the community; but the nation could never have an interest different from its own.—They conclude by remarking “the vital necessity of a certain infusion of royal and aristocratical influence” not only in the House of Commons, but in the election of its members, “lest the control of the executive should be utterly lost and abandoned, and the government be changed into a virtual republic.” But supposing a Reform in Parliament to have taken place, is it probable that a Parliament chosen by the whole people could have any interest which the King ought to stand in the way of? Or if he did, should he not be compelled to yield? Besides, the horror of such a republic must appear not a little extraordinary after granting, that all the power of the state resides at present in the House of Commons. Would not to reform the House of Commons only be to change a bad form of republican government for a good? and is not a republic, with a king at its head, to fill the niche of royalty and keep a tyrant out of his place, not only the theory of our constitution, but the best of all forms of government? D. D.

*Montrose, 31st August, 1809.*

# OFFICIAL PAPERS.

## EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.

*From the London Gazette, Sept. 2, 1809.*

A dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was yesterday morning received at the office of lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty’s principal Secretaries of State, from lieutenant-general the earl of Chatham, dated head-quarters, Bathz, August 29, 1809:

My Lord; Major Bradford delivered

to me your lordship's dispatch of the 21st instant, signifying to me his majesty's commands that I should convey to lieutenant-general sir Eyre Coote, the general and other officers and troops employed before Flushing, and particularly to those of the artillery and engineer departments, his majesty's most gracious approbation of their conduct; and which I have obeyed with the most entire satisfaction. I had the honour in my last dispatch of acquainting your lordship with my intention of proceeding to this place, and I should have been most happy to have been enabled to have announced to your lordship the further progress of this army. Unfortunately, however, it becomes my duty to state to your lordship, that, from the concurrent testimony from so many quarters, as to leave no doubt of the truth of the information, the enemy appears to have collected so formidable a force, as to convince me that the period was arrived, at which my instructions would have directed me to withdraw the army under my command, even if engaged in actual operation. I had certainly early understood on my arrival at Walcheren, that the enemy were assembling in considerable force at all points; but I was unwilling to give too much credit to these reports, and I was determined to persevere, until I was satisfied, upon the fullest information, that all further attempts would be unavailable.—From all our intelligence it appears, that the force of the enemy in this quarter, distributed between the environs of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Lillo, and Antwerp, and cantoned on the opposite coast, is not less than 35,000 men, and by some statements it is estimated higher. Though a landing on the Continent might, I have no doubt, have been forced, yet, as the siege of Antwerp, the possession of which could alone have secured to us any of the ulterior objects of the Expedition, was by this state of things rendered utterly impracticable, such a measure, if successful, could have led to no solid advantage; and the retreat of the army, which must at an early period have been inevitable, would have been exposed to much hazard. The utmost force (and that daily decreasing) that I could have brought into the field, after providing for the occupation of Walcheren and South Beveland, would have amounted to about 23,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Your lordship must at

once see, even if the enemy's force had been less numerous than represented, after the necessary detachments to observe the garrisons of Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, and securing our communications, how very inadequate a force must have remained for operations against Lillo and Liefkenshoek, and ultimately against Antwerp, which town, so far from being in the state which had been reported, is, from very correct accounts, represented to be in a complete state of defence; and the enemy's ships had been brought up and placed in security under the guns of the citadel. Under these circumstances, however mortifying to me to see the progress arrested of an army, from whose good conduct and valour I had every thing to hope, I feel that my duty left me no other course than to close my operations here; and it will always be a satisfaction to me to think that I have not been induced lightly to commit the safety of the army confided to me, or the reputation of his majesty's arms. It was an additional satisfaction to me to find that the unanimous opinion of the lieutenant generals of this army, whom I thought it right to consult, more out of respect to them, than that I thought a doubt could be entertained on the subject, concurred entirely in the sentiments I have submitted to your lordship. I am concerned to say, that the effect of the climate at this unhealthy period of the year is felt most seriously, and that the number of sick already is little short of 3,000 men. It is my intention to withdraw gradually from the advanced position in this island, and sending into Walcheren such an additional force as may be necessary to secure that important possession, to embark the remainder of the troops, and to hold them in readiness to avail myself of his majesty's further commands, which I shall most anxiously expect. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CHATHAM.

## COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes of the above Work, comprising the Proceedings in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, are in the Press, and will be published with all possible dispatch.